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A NEGATIVE FISCAL MULTIPLIER? 
 
Alan L. Lougheed 
 
The so-called negative fiscal multiplier concept comes from the neo-classical free market 
economic philosophy and is found useful in arguing that fiscal stabilisation policy may 
produce results contrary to those expected under Keynesian analysis in which the (positive) 
fiscal multiplier has traditionally been accepted as the norm. As a result, “fiscal 
consolidation” (FC hereafter), that is, the creation and maintenance of the classical balanced 
budget, ensures that fiscal policy cannot be used for stabilising the economy . Indeed, any 
attempt to do so will be harmful.1 This idea has been advanced and research into its possible 
existence during the last twenty years has produced some encouraging results. This paper 
examines this research in further detail. 
 
 
Key Terms:   
(JEL code: I 31) 
                                                 
1  Why could not Fiscal Consolidation, which implies that something is necessarily wrong, have been called 
Fiscal Reconstruction, which is not highly emotive? It is also necessary to differentiate at first between the two 
concepts which become intertwined in the analysis: fiscal consolidation and the fiscal multiplier, The first 
involves a reconstruction of fiscal policy - a long-run process concerned with immense changes in attitudes with 
long-run implications and especially the attainment over time of a budget surplus. The fiscal multiplier analysis 
is relatively short-run and involves the impact on GDP of an attempt to alter the level of government 
expenditure or taxation as part of the government's stabilisation policy. It is with the latter that we are concerned 
with in this paper even though such a change in either variable may also be a step towards (or away from) fiscal 
consolidation, but only one step at a time. 
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SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
Consider the effects of a rundown of a country’s public debt accumulated over several years 
as a result of deficit budgeting. Suppose the government of a country undertakes an FC 
programme by introducing a budget containing reduced public expenditure, for example, by 
running down its consumption expenditure, downsizing its labour force, reducing its transfers 
to the unemployed, the aged, and to other unfortunates, or by cutting back capital works. In 
analysing the impact of such a reduction, let us follow the two main arguments. 
 
First, by the Keynesian approach, reducing government expenditure by itself acts directly and 
adversely on GDP. The multiplier effects occur when those affected in the private sector by 
reduced income must also cut back their expenditure out of lower incomes and thus help to 
influence GDP adversely (a positive fiscal multiplier) and/or have a negative impact on the 
balance of payments or the exchange rate, if floating exchange rate policy is being followed. 
On the other hand, this argument is dismissed completely by the second approach. The 
reduction in the public debt with a lower deficit reduces the public sector demand for loans 
and this reduces interest rates. Lower interest rates attract private borrowing for investment, 
which will increase GDP. If it is expected that the government’s actions will be beneficial to 
the economy, the latter will be reinforced. This is where the negative fiscal multiplier enters 
the argument: by reducing government expenditure, GDP rises, because any multiplier which 
may be relevant is negative.2 Similar arguments apply if increased taxation is used as a means  
                                                 
2  Economic theory has produced numerous models to demonstrate the impact of fiscal policy and monetary 
policy on GDP and the balance of payments. From the Mundell-Fleming models (fn) it has been suggested that 
fiscal policy works best under a fixed exchange rate regime, being rather limited in its application under floating 
rates (especially if capital is highly mobile). Monetary policy (interest rate policy) has its greatest impact under 
floating exchange rates and is rather poor in its applications under a fixed rate system. The latter also has its 
problems as there is a lagged response in terms of GDP changes which may extend up to 15 months in duration. 
It also works best if capital flows are highly mobile. 
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of running down the budget deficit.3 
 
There are numerous extensions of the neo-classical approach - all couched as models which 
are very flexible and streamlined in theory.
4
 There are, however, at least two types of 
comments about this model, which spring to mind. First, do business firms and consumers 
react as quickly as the model suggests to any change in government policy and are all 
members of society perfectly au fait with neo-classical macroeconomic thinking so as to react 
instantaneously to government policy changes? One would expect that only a very small 
proportion of the population (for obvious reasons) would be ‘rational’ enough to see all the 
pros and cons of the changes involved. In addition, one could predict that, to implement the 
changes, there would be many obstacles to overcome which in theory are easily brushed 
aside, including the ceteris paribus assumption in the economic analysis. 
 
Second, a recent comment by Robert Theobald appears appropriate here:  
 
“The acceptance of economic thinking ... and the current worship of free markets as 
the source of all good is, without doubt, the most extraordinary triumph of theory over 
reality in human history.” (Business History Review, 5 November, 1999, p. 52.) 
 
In the current adulation of the business firm, the numbers of failed businesses, headed by 
inadequate and/or self-seeking CEOs, do not receive sufficient, if any, attention. 
 
So we have alternative macroeconomic approaches but the one favoured at the moment and 
the one which accords best with the modern laissez faire is the neo-classical approach. But 
which of the two in reality will produce the desired ends? 
                                                 
3  “The neo-classical hypothesis suggests that determined action to reduce the budget deficit (‘fiscal 
consolidation’) would give the public at large confidence that the government is finally getting its house in order 
and will be borrowing less in the future, thereby lowering interest rates throughout the economy. This would 
spur businessmen and investors into economic activity ... during the immediate period of fiscal consolidation. If 
this view is correct, and  politicians can be convinced that reducing the budget deficit would not impose a severe 
penalty on economic growth, there would be less political inclination to delay reforms needed in deficit 
countries.” (McDermott, C. John and Wescott, Robert F., 1996, p.3), The authors have thus assumed their 
conclusions are correct before proving such is the case. 
4  See article by Tony Makin, 1998, pp. 419-426, and extensions to the model. 
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One could argue that the outcome would result from the different strengths of the two 
approaches, each having an impact on economic activity. Together, they cover the impact on 
demand and on supply factors. However, whole-heartedly embracing the second ignores the 
proposition that there are weaknesses in this approach in some of its crucial steps. Why 
should a reduction in public demand for loans necessarily reduce the domestic rate of interest 
in a world of open free capital markets? Why should there occur a desire for businesses 
immediately to expand investment?  
 
The willingness of the business sector to invest is not absolutely identical with its ability to 
invest. The demand side of the equation must be considered along with the supply side. And 
this appears to be a crucial weakness of this neo-classical argument. The only situation in 
which investment expenditure would increase is if businessmen expected a rise in GDP 
irrespective of government fiscal policy, that is, if renewed economic growth (or recovery) 
and rising demand were anticipated, and if so, it would be entirely separate from the public 
retrenchment. In addition, such investment expenditure would occur only after a lengthy lag 
and, especially if it involved the implementation of fixed investment.  
 
The negative fiscal multiplier argument as presented in the literature also relies on the 
manipulation of statistical data in such a way that only ‘structural’ features of the economy 
are considered, that is, after the elimination of the cyclical aspects of the statistical series, as 
are existing expansionary pressures. It also appears that every other factor which could cause 
investment to rise, for GDP to expand, for the public debt to decline, are assumed away.
5
 
These features of the analysis aimed at proving the existence of a “negative” fiscal multiplier 
                                                 
5  See comment on the structural approach in IMF, World Economic Survey, October 1998, p. 93, f.n.. 2: “The 
structural budget position is defined as the actual budget deficit (or surplus) less the effects of cyclical 
deviations of output from potential output. Because of the margin of uncertainty that attaches to estimates of 
cyclical gaps and to tax and expenditure elasticities with respect to national income, indicators of structural 
budget positions should be interpreted as broad orders of magnitude. Moreover, it is important to note that 
changes in structural budget balances are not necessarily attributable to policy changes but may reflect the built-
in momentum of existing expenditure programs. In the period beyond that for which specific consolidation 
programs exist, it is assumed that the structural deficit remains unchanged.” 
 5 
favour the discovery of such a phenomenon, perhaps to the detriment of the more appropriate 
determinants. 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The search for the existence of the NFM in reality found that in three cases out of the sixty-
odd examined there was substantial evidence of success. This is not encouraging. It was 
explained that a negative fiscal multiplier would most likely occur if a reduction in 
government expenditure (desirably consumption expenditure and/or transfers) occurred in a 
period of economic expansion.
6
 Let us continue the discussion by referring to the three so-
called highly successful cases: Denmark (1983-86), Ireland (1986-89), and New Zealand 
(1992-95). Let us also consider the actual situations in these three countries and not the 
highly drawn situations of the proponents.
7
 We must also consider the caveats noted above.  
 
The Case of Denmark: 1982-86
8
 
 
McDermott and Wescott (p. 11) note that the primary budget deficit in Denmark in the early 
1980s was around 6.5 per cent of GDP, and argue that, as a result, a sharp FC began in 1982 
and in the next four years reduced the structural primary deficit (as a share of GDP) by 10 
per cent, yet the economy expanded, and the consumption to GDP ratio rose by several 
                                                 
6  If so, however, the ceteris paribus aspects of the model would not apply. Other factors would also be 
operating on GDP and thus the NFM would have no substance. 
7  See McDermott and Wescott, op. cit. for explanations of all the possible cases, including the three that stood 
out. Of the three countries studied below, only New Zealand could claim to follow a floating exchange rate 
policy during its relevant period. The situations regarding the other two are not clear cut and require special 
noting. Both countries were members of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), under which member 
currencies followed a strict course tied to the ECU (European Currency Unit). While the ECU floated against 
the U.S. dollar as did all member currencies comprising the ERM, each currency also followed an 'adjustable 
peg' (virtually a fixed) exchange rate system vis-a-vis the others in the system. In reality the Danish and Irish 
currencies were almost fixed in terms of the other five (whose countries held important markets for their goods 
and from whom capital funds were readily available).Thus domestic policies in these two countries had a very 
limited impact upon each country's currency; rather the impact can be seen principally in each country's 
international currency reserves. Neither country had a major influence on the movements of the ECU as the 
economic activities of the larger members, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands influenced the snake's 
movements most of all. The kroner and the Irish pound responded to the movements of the ECU rather than 
determining such movements. New Zealand's case was different and its situation will be discussed separately 
below. 
8  See McDermott and Wescott, ibid., p. 50. In 1982, however, FC did not start before October with the new 
budget and other measures. 
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percentage points. Were the changes solely attributable to the reduced budget deficit? 
 
It is noted that towards the end of 1982, the Danish economy, along with most of its 
neighbours,
9
 recovered from the recession of the early 1980s before FC could have had any 
influence on economic activity and experienced economic growth in mid-decade. 
Nevertheless, the slump which occurred in 1986 and the following years virtually until 1994, 
was not common within the European Union, certainly not in the late eighties. On economic 
activity in general, there is the suggestion that natural recovery and growth forces were at 
work between 1982 and 1986 and that, whatever FC forces were exerted on GDP, such forces 
may have been transitory or less intense than the above authors argue. 
 
‘The turnaround in the government’s budget from deficit to surplus beats that in any 
other OECD country. But only half of the improvement was the result of tighter 
fiscal policies. Much of the rest reflected a boom in economic activity that has 
automatically raised tax receipts .... a faster pace of domestic demand caused the 
current account deficit to widen.’
10
 (The Economist, 3/09/88, p. 70) 
 
The primary budget balance could not be consolidated as the figures after 1986 show a 
sustained return to massive deficits which continued into the 1990s.
11
 
 
What were the intentions of the Danish government in 1982? A change in government 
occurred in October leading to a new economic strategy incorporated in the following March 
budget, aimed at ‘fostering growth and employment while eliminating the current external 
imbalance and eventually reduce foreign indebtedness.’ At first there was an attempt to 
reduce inflation, improve the public finances, adopt ‘a tighter incomes policy to reduce the 
domestic costs and price increases and to ensure better international competitiveness.’ 
Externally, a ‘firm’ exchange rate policy was introduced to moderate inflationary 
                                                 
9  For example, Norway, without FC, recorded annual percentages of 0.9 per cent in 1981 and 0.3 per cent in 
1982, followed by 4.6, 5.7, 5.3, and 4.2 per cent from 1983 to 1986, roughly mirroring the Danish performance. 
See OECD, World Economic Outlook, 1996, p. A4.. 
10 How the ‘half’ was calculated was not revealed. 
11 In the last three years of the 1980s, the budget surplus fell each year, becoming negative in 1990 after which 
year the budget deficit expanded to exceed 50 billion kroner by 1994.  
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expectations (OECD. Economic Survey: Denmark, 1984).
12
 It is to be noted that FC formed 
only a part of the new strategy.  
 
As a result of the new approach, the budget balance improved from some kr30 billion deficit 
in 1982 to over kr30 billion surplus in 1986.
13
 To achieve this result, taxation revenue 
increased in every year but so too did expenditure. The improvement came about because the 
increases in taxation greatly exceeded those in revenue, especially in 1986. In addition the 
accumulation of surpluses reduced the public debt which had risen to a peak in 1982, much of 
it being foreign debt.
14
  
 
While not all of the capital inflow can be attributed to government borrowing, the size of the 
annual inflow demonstrates that crowding out forces within the domestic capital market were 
weak during these years, for both the government and the private sector found foreign capital 
markets very accessible.15  
 
So far, the evidence, using actual National Accounts figures, suggest that the forces 
underlying the neo-classical case may be weak in that taxation not expenditure formed the 
basis for a declining deficit, that expenditure did not fall absolutely during the period under 
discussion. Under the NFM sequence of events, the decline in the fiscal deficit should lead 
through interest rate decreases (as the Government’s demand for domestic loanable funds 
falls) to increases in private investment which would favour increased growth of GDP. 
Interest rates were falling, as they were throughout Europe, but not primarily, it seems, in 
                                                 
12 Nevertheless the kroner remained in the ERM. 
13 Of the several estimates appropriate for this paragraph, the OECD, Quarterly National Accounts, 1996, No.2, 
pp. 375ff. have been used. 
14 According to the OECD, ibid., the net borrowing from the rest of the world yearly from 1982 to 1986 was 
kr20b., kr14b., kr19b., kr29b. and kr37b. The kroner fell in value from 1980 to the end of 1984 but then 
appreciated to 1987. Thus, borrowing abroad, at least for a while after 1984, could have been quite profitable. 
15  Denmark’s foreign debt stood at 30 per cent of GDP in 1981, “much of it public borrowing to finance 
budget deficits” (The Economist, 13/04/85, p. 16). This source went on to assert that the foreign debt at that 
stage was becoming so large that the interest payments on it still contributed to the large current account 
deficits. See also OECD, Economic Survey: Denmark, 1987/88, p. 76, f.n. 14. 
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response to government fiscal action.
16
 Thus investors must believe that the reduction in the 
fiscal deficit was encouraging before they would increase their investment expenditure - a 
more nebulous proposition. As it happened, gross fixed investment rose in every year from 
1981 to 1986, but most rapidly in 1984, 1985, and 1986, after which year it fell (in current 
and constant prices) (OECD, ibid., pp. 120, 121)..17  Nevertheless, although interest rates did 
decline, there appears little evidence that they were substantially affected by FC during this 
period. At least two reasons could account for this. First, the government could have 
borrowed extensively abroad and second, the central bank operated a very liberal monetary 
policy ostensibly to offset the tight fiscal policy. 
 
The government’s mistake was running a permissive monetary policy along with a 
strict fiscal one. The money supply rose by 25 per cent in 1983 bank credit had begun 
to expand as well. The lax monetary policy prompted a sharp recovery in private 
sector demand, which in turn is the cause of the alarming increase in imports. (The 
Economist, 30 June, 1984, p. 59)18 
 
In addition, to encouraging higher consumer spending, the increasing funds in the country no 
doubt helped to reduce interest rates. At the same time, personal consumption rose in every 
year from 1982 to 1987 (in the last of these years the budget deficit began to expand again),
19
 
although it grew more slowly than GDP, during a period in which consumer prices were 
falling. 
20
 
 
                                                 
16 The official discount rate was reduced from eleven per cent to ten per cent in November 1982, to 8.5 per cent 
in March 1983, 7.5 per cent the following month and to seven per cent in May. From October 1983 throughout 
the rest of the period it was held at this level.  In addition, other interest rates tended to fluctuate but in a 
downward direction during much of the period. The long-term bond yield declined progressively from a peak of 
21.3 per cent in May 1982 until the end of 1983 when it recorded 13 per cent. After some variations around this 
level for some time it slowly fell after March 1985 to reach its nadir in April 1896 at 9.2 per cent. Thereafter it 
rose. Note that, in 1982 and the next four years, interest rates fell in all industrial countries. (see IMF, Monthly 
Economic Indicators, various issues). Clearly a common factor was at work at this time. 
17  In constant prices terms, much of the increase was in ‘machinery and equipment’ (ibid.). 
18  Despite the reductions in the money supply at the beginning of 1984, it maintained a high rate of growth 
which was not reduced below 10 per cent for the first time during the 1980s until late in 1986.  
19  It is also apparent that, despite the large increase in the consumption to GDP ratio stated by McDermott and 
Wescott (see above), some statistics suggest that from 1982 to 1986, the ratio of private consumption 
expenditure to GDP remained remarkably stable at around 54 per cent in current and constant 1980 prices terms 
(see OECD, Quarterly National Accounts, 1996, no. 2, pp. 114, 115). 
20 The annual increase in consumer prices had begun to fall as early as 1981, but it fell sharply in 1983 and 
again in 1984. 
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It does seem possible that investors may have been encouraged by other factors as much as or 
more than by the expectations they had from the reduction in the budget deficit. In addition to 
the above, one has to consider the impact of the government wages legislation which saw the 
abolition of wage indexation in October 1982 and the restriction on the growth of government 
workers’ wages to four per cent a year late in 1982 in line with the trend in the private 
sector.
21
 From 1983 to 1985 at least the annual increases in hourly earnings were below the 
rate of inflation, a reduction in production costs benefiting Danish producers, tending to 
improve their competitiveness domestically and vis-a-vis their foreign counterparts. The 
kroner depreciated by almost half vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar from 1980 to 1984, favouring 
Danish exporters to non-EU markets but a strong appreciation of the currency after 1984 
tended somewhat to offset this advantage. In addition, the state of the European economy 
must have had some influence even if only to the extent that the trends in many Danish 
economic series merely mirrored those in the series of other countries or country groups 
where fiscal consolidation was not being pursued so dogmatically. 
 
Finally, there is the question of lags. Taking into account that the change in government in 
October 1982 and that the new approach to fiscal policy were unanticipated, the introduction 
of the new policy could not have influenced businessmen overnight. They could not suddenly 
decide that a brighter future meant that they could implement new investment programmes 
immediately. For example, it would have taken several months before the change in 
government finances would have taken place and the impact on interest rates become evident. 
Even so, private investment in extensions to works or new plant would take some time to 
arrange, even though the portents were correct. The neo-classical approach has not taken into 
account these and other lags associated with sudden change. Nor has it recognised that 
private firms would have had to possess some knowledge of the possible trend in the demand 
for its additional output, either domestically or abroad. 
 
                                                 
21 According to The Economist (23/11/85), Danish workers experienced a fall in real earnings for five 
successive years to 1984, followed by a modest rise in 1985. 
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The sequence of events required to maintain the NFM argument did not occur in the Danish 
case; other factors were also determining events during this time. 
 
Taking all the remarks above into account, it is not a foregone conclusion that what happened 
in the Danish economy in the mid-1980s was solely the result of the FC, or that the upward 
trends of 1982 and 1983 were wholly determined by the government. Other growth-
generating forces were at work. Moreover, it is inevitable that natural forces aided the 
recovery from the recession of 1980-81, as would have the inbuilt budget stabilizers, rarely 
mentioned by the neo-classicals.  
 
The Case of Ireland: 1987-90 
 
McDermott and Wescott note (p. 11) that Ireland had attempted FC in 1982 and that, by 
1984, the structural primary budget deficit had been reduced by seven per cent of GDP 
mainly with the use of higher taxes. But output fell along Keynesian lines!
22
 The next attempt 
at FC began in 1987 with reliance on large cuts in government consumption expenditure. The 
result was a decline in the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio from 1987 to 1989 with an 
expansionary boost to output and nearly a 20 per cent reduction in the ratio of gross public 
debt to GDP. The changes in the two periods are remarkable with a suggestion to the sceptics 
of the involvement of other factors. In this respect, the OECD noted that, during the latter 
period, Ireland achieved rapid economic growth, falling unemployment, and improving 
performances in exports and the balance of payments. It went on to note: 
 
“The adoption of medium-term strategy of wage moderation, fiscal restraint, and 
narrow-band membership of the ERM, provided the policy basis for these 
developments, although they also owed much to a favourable external  
                                                 
22  Not all commentators would describe the result of this first effort as a failure, although executed along 
Keynesian lines. Presumably it failed because it did not result in the neo-classical conclusion. 
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environment. (OECD, Economic Survey: Ireland, 1992-93, p. 9)
23
 
 
If this statement is a true reflection of the situation at the time, it is impossible to allocate the 
events of the period to only one of the forces at work at the time. It seems that ceteris paribus 
did not prevail. 
 
Ireland’s real GDP rose rapidly in 1987, following the small, absolute, decline in 1986 and 
such growth continued through to 1990, being higher in the last two  
years. (OECD, Historical Statistics, various) Because of this expansion, unemployment fell 
even if slowly from a peak of 19.5 per cent of the labour force in May 1987 to around 17 per 
cent in 1990.
24
 
 
Other figures, for example, GDP per capita and productivity (GDP per worker) also rose, 
with the largest increases occurring in 1989 and 1990, the years of the highest real GDP 
advances. At the same time, consumer price increases remained below four per cent while 
average weekly earnings rose annually at a decreasing rate from 7.5 per cent in 1986 to 3.8 
per cent in 1990. In the latter year, wages tended to stagnate. The labour market was 
somewhat depressed during the whole period, despite the moderate fall in unemployment, a 
feature reflected in workers’ earnings. On workers’ earnings, it must be noted that the 
October 1987 agreement between the government and the unions to the effect that wage 
increases would not exceed 2.5 per cent in any of the next three years was undoubtedly the 
main cause of the real hourly earnings in manufacturing failing to exceed 2.5 per cent in any 
year from 1987 and 1993.
25
 Such wage restraint no doubt placed a limit on cost increases and 
made businesses more competitive relative to their foreign counterparts, but wage policy was 
                                                 
23  Also see ibid., 1990-91, p. 31: ‘The good performance of the Irish economy over the past four years has 
been the result of a combination of favourable influences which have been mutually reinforcing ...’ Note that, in 
the years 1987 to 1990, GDP rose faster than at any time in the last 20 years (to the present date). Although 
GDP for the EU as a whole was relatively high in 1988 and 1989, the figures for Ireland were much higher in 
these two years. 
24 Note, however, the use of Ireland’s unemployment figures is suspect to the extent that a large amount of 
emigration and immigration was occurring during these years. 
25  See OECD, Economic Survey: Ireland, Annex Table 13, various issues. See also ibid.., p. 21: ‘As a result of 
comparatively modest increases in real wage rates, Ireland’s competitive position, as measured by movements in 
relative unit labour costs in manufacturing in a common currency, has strengthened. 
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separate from the NFM argument, even if it was a condition for FC to work. 
 
Whereas real private consumption spending rose rapidly from 1986 to 1988 as a reaction to 
tax cuts and lower interest rates, its rate of growth fell substantially in the next two years. In 
addition, private final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP fell slowly from 
1986 to 1990. Whereas real gross fixed capital formation declined absolutely after 1981 in 
almost every year until 1989, it rose sharply in the latter year by 12.8 per cent and 12 per cent 
in 1990. Whatever produced the increases in GDP in 1987 and 1988, it seems that investment 
expenditure, supposedly the prime mover of increased economic activity as domestic interest 
rates fell in response to the government's reduced demand for funds as its deficit declined, 
played little part. But interest rates followed a different path. Most series fluctuated widely in 
1985 and 1986 then fell rapidly in the first half of 1987, bottomed out in the second half of 
1988, then rose until the end of the period. Indeed, it was during the period of rising interest 
rates that private investment began to increase most markedly! At the same time, inflation 
was not of great concern to policy makers. 
 
Before considering the strengths of other factors, including those arising out of trade and 
foreign investment activity, let us consider carefully the changing budgetary scene. In terms 
of FC (not in structural terms, which would not have been understood by non-economists), 
despite the IMF research arguments,
26
 the central government’s current budget balance 
improved by over IR£1 billion
27
 from 1987 to 1990 (both inclusive), mostly in 1988. The 
major contribution to this improvement came from the increases in tax revenue (£1.1 billion) 
rather than reduced expenditure. Indeed government expenditure increased by some £700 
million during these years
28
  
 
 
                                                 
26 See IMF, Can fiscal consolidation be expansionary in the short-run? World Economic Outlook, May 1995, 
Box 2. 
27  In the section on Ireland, Irish currency will be used. 
28 Figures are derived from the United Nations, National Accounts Statistics, 1994, pp. 889-909. Also see 
OECD, Economic Survey: Ireland, various issues. 
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These changes meant that net (Exchequer) government borrowing, while positive in every 
year, was reduced from £2.15 billion in 1987 to £460 million in 1990. It was in March 1987 
that the new Haughey government began to change the nature of the government budget. 
While it would have been some time before these changes could have made any impression 
on economic activity, except for business and other expectations, the movement in the 
domestic debt did not change direction until 1988 and thus interest rates would not have 
fallen directly as a result of the move to FC until then.
29
 Thus the chain in the NFM argument 
was broken. Other factors must have accounted for the direction of interest rate changes in 
these years! The big influence originated perhaps in the external sector. 
 
Before considering the trade sector it is important to note another relevant factor which has 
had little attention in the literature, that is, the realignment of the Irish pound against other 
currencies. The Irish currency was devalued by eight per cent against other European 
currencies on 2 August 1986 while the upward revaluations in the following January of the 
German mark and the guilder (of three per cent) and of the Belgian franc of two per cent 
should have had some positive effects on the Irish trade figures and those of GDP as well 
(OECD, Economic Survey: Ireland, 1988/89, p. 25). Of these external economic changes and 
other factors, exports perhaps provided the greatest influence on GDP and other economic 
variables at this time. They increased from 52.7 per cent of GDP in 1986 to 63.5 per cent in 
1989, then fell back to 59.5 per cent in the following year. (OECD, Historical Statistics, 
1960-1993). It is difficult to argue that export growth was directly related to FC 
performance.
30
 After some fluctuations in 1985 and to mid-1986, a definite upward 
movement began in exports in July 1986, continuing until 1990. Imports followed with a lag, 
especially after January 1988. In other words, export expansion began well before the 
                                                 
29 It was a period of changing Exchequer loans from foreign sources to domestic sources for the Exchequer 
foreign debt fell from £49 billion in 1986 to £34 billion in 1990 whereas domestic debt rose from £66 billion in 
1986 to £69 billion in 1988 before falling to £62 billion in 1990. It is therefore not clear that the rise in domestic 
debt could have contributed to a decline in domestic interest rates until 1989! See OECD, Economic Survey: 
Ireland, 1992-93, p. 46. 
30 It is useful to note that in the late 1980s, 46 per cent of Ireland’s manufacturing employees worked for 
foreign multinationals who also accounted for 80 per cent of Ireland’s non-food exports and most exported their 
output (90 per cent of the American firms). These firms must have played an important part in export expansion 
and its contribution to GDP. 
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government’s new approach to FC in 1987.
31
 Indeed, investment decisions of the 
multinationals operating in Ireland would have been influenced little by changes in domestic 
interest rates. 
 
Returning to the NFM argument, the following comments are relevant. In the fall in the 
budget deficit, changes in both taxation and expenditure contributed, the former 
predominating (as it had done before in the early 1980s). Second, reductions in the rate of 
growth of government expenditure did not lead to reductions in social service payments 
which rose slowly except on 1989 when a slight fall did occur. Thus expenditure from this 
source would not have fallen substantially. Third, the notion that ‘crowding-in’ occurred, 
allowing interest rates to fall and thus private investment expenditure to rise, was well wide 
of the mark for this period. Interest rates did fall for much of the period but mainly in 
response to the downward trends abroad and not as a result of changes in the Government 
borrowing programmes. Fourth, following on, it is evident that the decline in the fiscal deficit 
had little domestic influence for, as noted above, until 1989, ‘Exchequer’ domestic debt 
actually rose: it was the foreign debt which was first to be reduced, by £16 billion from 1986 
to 1990 at a time when the domestic debt was reduced by some £3.3 billion (having increased 
to a peak in 1988).
32
 The favourable impact of the reduced budget deficit on domestic 
interest rates just did not happen, at least until 1989. Fifth, by Keynesian decrees, 
consumption expenditure should have continued to grow until 1988 because of the continuing 
deficit and the increased domestic debt and then declined. Indeed, its rate of growth in real 
terms rose until 1989, after which year it fell.  
 
Finally, there appears little more that could be advanced in support of the NFM argument. 
While it has some validity, its strength is much weaker than has been maintained. It failed in 
                                                 
31 One could argue that the restrictions on wages which could have increased industrial competitiveness, may 
have affected exports favourably and thus contributed to their increases. Against this however is the increase in 
imports which cannot be explained in this way. 
32 In 1989 and 1990, the reduced domestic debt amounted to £4.6 billion and £3.3 billion respectively. These 
debt figures come from the Table on “Foreign and Domestic Debt and Debt Servicing: Exchequer Debt”, in 
OECD, Economic Survey: Ireland, 1990-91, p. 129. 
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one of its crucial stages: the rise of domestic debt, a feature which could not have accounted 
for the decline in interest rates. Other factors were also important. In addition to the OECD 
comment noted in footnote reference 19 above, in another context, the OECD concluded: 
 
“Ireland has recovered strongly and, as a result of productivity gains and wage 
moderation, profitability and international competitiveness improved .... This good 
performance .... has also owed a great deal to a favourable world trading environment, 
in which rising export demand, buoyant tax revenues, and lower interest rates have 
made the goal of reducing government and external balances easier to attain.” (OECD, 
Economic Survey: Ireland, 1990-91, p. 9).  
 
There are several favourable influences here that are not related to fiscal adjustment. 
 
The Case of New Zealand: 1992-95 
 
According to McDermott and Wescott: 
 
New Zealand’s fiscal position shifted from a deficit of 5 per cent of GDP in 1992 to a 
surplus of 3 per cent of GDP in 1995, reflecting above all else structural measures that 
strengthened expenditure control. While revenue remained stable, expenditure as a 
share of GDP dropped by 10 percentage points over these years. Interest rates 
declined significantly. Despite the fiscal contraction, GDP growth revived - from 
minus 2.5 per cent in 1992 to plus 5.4 per cent in 1995 - while the unemployment rate 
was cut in half. Meanwhile the ratio of public debt to GDP dropped to 38 per cent 
from 52 per cent (McDermott and Wescott, op. cit., pp.10-1. My italics). 
 
The unusual phrase here is “above all else”, partly an admission that other factors could have 
contributed to the results mentioned but such factors receive no mention nor are they 
therefore compared with FC as determining forces. Nevertheless, let us update the statements 
made by the authors. First, the change in the budget position was from a deficit of 1.7 per 
cent of GDP to a surplus of 5.9 per cent. Revenue actually rose - by as much as 23 per cent, 
while government expenditure fell by only six per cent. Thus, in the fiscal consolidation, 
government revenue led expenditure. Interest rates had been declining substantially since the 
end of 1990 and the trend was not primarily caused by the changing fiscal balance. Indeed 
the fall in interest rates ended in the first quarter of 1994 and subsequently an almost 
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doubling of rates occurred by the end of that year. There was no sudden change in interest 
rates following the improving government balance and the decline in the government’s 
demand for funds, but the expectations of further falls were in the market. Investment should 
have responded to the interest rate decline from 1991 on, but it did not. Indeed, its highest 
level occurred in 1994 when interest rates were rising! Furthermore, the declining budget 
deficit should have reduced interest rates in 1994 and 1995, but this did not happen. Also, the 
rise in interest rates in these years should have had a depressing effect on private investment 
but, once again, it did not, suggesting that other, perhaps more important, factors were at 
work or that private investment was not so interest-sensitive at that time. One other factor 
which may have affected private investment was the switch of the government in its public 
debt with a decline in the foreign component and an increase in the domestic debt.
33
 This 
rising domestic debt would not have had the favourable impact associated with the NFM 
argument. Indeed, the increased government demand for internal funds would have had the 
opposite effect! A curious fact about the NFM analysis is that even though interest rates were 
falling internally until 1994, they were doing so at the same time as internal government debt 
was rising. Where, therefore, came the pressures for increasing private investment at this 
time? Perhaps it would have been only through the nebulous expectations of future trends 
from declining government deficits. Was the business sector so sensitive to possible future 
events and trends?  
 
At this stage it should be noted that New Zealand’s GDP rose in 1992 (giving the possibility 
of a NFM example) as the economy recovered from a protracted recession in the four 
previous years, in two of which GDP actually declined.( International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook, May 1997, p. 132).
34
 The years 1993 to 1995 were good years; GDP rose 
at over five per cent in the last two years, the best for many years. In its 1992-93 survey of 
the New Zealand economy the OECD noted: 
 
                                                 
33 External government debt fell from NZ$20.6 billion in 1990 progressively to $13 billion in 1995, during 
which period the total debt fell very marginally, while domestic debt rose from $23.8 billion to $31.1 billion. 
34 From 1989 to 1992 the annual (calendar year) percentage growth rates were 0.8, -0.2, -1.7, and 0.9.  
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The economy turned around in the third quarter of 1991, as domestic demand 
bottomed out and strong export growth continued. New Zealand’s competitive 
position has improved markedly over the past two years. This has resulted from 
price factors stemming from low wage and price inflation combined with an 
exchange-rate depreciation (OECD, Economic Survey, New Zealand, 1992-93, pp. 
115-6). 
 
In other words, domestic demand was recovering, exports expanding, wages stationary, and 
the rate of exchange declining. The Report went on to explain this economic state as being 
derived from all the reforms undertaken during the previous decade along laissez-faire lines. 
This claim was repeated in the following year. It was not claimed in any year that the state of 
the economy resulted from a decrease in government expenditure in the 1992-94 years to 
wipe out a fiscal deficit. By 1999, it appears, New Zealand economists were still debating 
whether the upturn in the economy in these years was a reaction to the (cyclical?) decline of 
1990 and 1991, a natural recovery, or wholly the result of the changes in the government’s 
budgetary policy of previous years.
35
 Yet, however much the structural changes may have 
contributed to the changes in 1992-95, such contributions have little relevance for the NFM 
thesis which must relate to changes which occurred no earlier than 1992.
36
 
 
Some Conclusions 
 
It is clear that a strong case for a negative fiscal multiplier has not been established in the 
three cases examined. That does not mean that we can exclude the possibility of such a 
phenomenon in other instances, but it does appear that such may be difficult to locate, for a 
                                                 
35 See the New Zealand Year Book for 1998, pp. 367ff. It concluded that the effectiveness of reforms remained 
inconclusive (p. 369). This argument, based on the previous reforms of the past began to wear thin in 1995 in 
which year New Zealand’s growth rate began to decline, at first from the six per cent recorded in 1994 to four 
per cent, followed in the next three years by 3.1, 2.1, and -0.3 per cent, while exports, which were hailed as the 
perfect variable for exemplifying the increased competitiveness of the country’s industries from the reforms of 
previous years, rose slowly in 1990 and 1991, but increased rapidly in 1993 and 1994, seemingly justifying the 
common argument of the time. The increased competitiveness argument does not explain the drastic fall in the 
rate of growth of New Zealand’s exports in 1996 (5.1 per cent) and their absolute decline of 2.2 per cent in 1997 
nor does it explain the buoyant commodity imports through the same period, when increased industry 
competitiveness should have led to much import substitution. But imports also fell in 1997. (Trade figures are in 
current prices) On the other hand, the exchange rate, which was falling from 1990 to the end of 1992 and was 
then rising right through to 1997 may have been the important determining factor at the time. 
36 Then again, if all the structural reforms ‘of previous years’ had accounted for all the improvements in the NZ 
economy up to 1995, why has economic performance been so miserable since - was that also a result of the 
structural reform? Or are we to ascribe all the good things that happen to structural reform and all the bad things 
to other forces? 
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number of reasons. 
 
First, in the application of their model to the real world, the IMF authors were unable to make 
use of the assumption of ceteris paribus. Second, it appears that the NFM’s existence may be 
restricted to a situation in which some economic expansion is under way or if the economy is 
proceeding out of a recession. This was so for each of the countries examined above. 
Moreover, the two advocates for the NFM virtually agree that such may be necessary.
37
 
Third, the possible existence of automatic fiscal stabilisers is not recognised. Finally, the 
strict adherence to the theory does not allow the required conclusions to be reached. To prove 
the point one must follow the strict sequences of events required by the theoretical model. 
 
Despite these comments, there appears to be some logic in the concept. It is possible that the 
real situation at any relevant period of time requires a balancing of the two approaches to 
fiscal change, namely, its impact on demand and also on supply; whichever is the stronger 
would determine the sign of any existing fiscal multiplier. Perhaps this may be the answer as 
to why the analytical results have diverged from one country to another.38 
                                                 
37 See Fiscal reforms that work, p. 10: ‘...strong global economic growth helps to achieve successful 
consolidation, and weak global growth reduces the chances that consolidation will cut the debt-to-GDP ratio.’ 
Whence the ceteris paribus assumption here! 
38 Some other instances which may require comment include the use of fiscal policy to overcome Japan's 
economic problems throughout the 1990s. Fiscal stimulus does not appear to have achieved any positive results 
but neither did monetary policy which led to the lowest interest rates in the industrial world. The Japanese 
Target call rate was lowered to zero per cent recently and has been below 0.5 per cent at least since 1995. The 
answers of course include the deep-seated economic problems confronting Japan with heavily indebted financial 
institutions unable to respond to any government stimulus, and other causes, rather than a purely cyclical 
problem. Australia appears to have gained from fiscal consolidation in recent years, (at least it has, for what it is 
worth, run several budget surpluses) but this is part of structural reform rather than a case in which the 
possibility of a negative fiscal multiplier has been evident. But it is one case which requires analysis in the 
future. 
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